Francisco Didiano v. Karen Balicki by unknown
2012 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-17-2012 
Francisco Didiano v. Karen Balicki 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012 
Recommended Citation 
"Francisco Didiano v. Karen Balicki" (2012). 2012 Decisions. 713. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2012/713 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2012 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 11-2380 
_____________ 
 
FRANCISCO DIDIANO, 
                               Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KAREN BALICKI; SOUTH WOODS STATE PRISON; 
JOHN DOE(S) 1-10;JOHN DOE(S) 11-20 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY 
(D.C. Civil No. 1-10-cv-04483) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
July 10, 2012 
____________ 
 
Before: RENDELL, SMITH and BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judges 
(Opinion Filed: July 17, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, 
 
Circuit Judge 
Appellant Francisco Didiano (“Didiano”) appeals the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment in favor of the South Woods State Prison and Karen Balicki, the 
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prison administrator.  We will affirm.      
I. 
In December 2008, Didiano was an inmate at South Woods State Prison in 
Bridgetown, New Jersey.  He had three cellmates, including a man named Duan Howard 
(“Howard”), a prisoner classified as having “mental health special needs.”  On December 
19, 2008, Howard used a prison-issued “hot pot” to boil water in the cell.  Under normal 
circumstances, the prison-issued hot pots are not supposed to be able to bring water to a 
boil, but Howard had altered his device to increase its power.  Howard then used the 
boiling water to attack Didiano, pouring it all over Didiano’s face, head, neck, shoulders 
and back while he was asleep in the cell.  As a result, Didiano sustained serious and 
permanent injuries and was taken to an outside hospital to receive treatment for his burns.  
Following his discharge from the hospital, he was transferred to the medical wing of 
Northern State Prison to convalesce.  On January 29, 2009, about a month after the 
assault, Didiano was transferred back to South Woods State Prison.             
 In April 2009, Didiano used the help of a so-called “prison paralegal” named Nash 
to file three official administrative complaints, called Inmate Remedy Forms, with the 
prison.  The record is bereft of information about Nash, and there is no evidence that he 
was a prison official or employee.  Didiano claims that he depended upon the services of 
Nash in using the Inmate Remedy System because he has “limited facility with the 
English language and with writing in particular.”  Nash filled out the three administrative 
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complaints, alleging: (1) that the prison had “been negligent in administering medical care 
and treatment” to Didiano; (2) that Howard’s assault on Didiano was due to the prison’s 
“failure to properly inspect and adhere to safety standards”; and (3) that, because Howard 
was a “special needs” inmate, the prison should not have housed him in the general 
population.   
Sometime later, prison officials responded with a “Corrective Action Form,” 
which identified several deficiencies with the complaints.  In particular, the Corrective 
Action Form stated: (1) that Didiano must complete a Health Services Request Form; (2) 
that his complaints did not contain specific information, and he must resubmit the 
complaint with additional information; and (3) that he cannot use the Inmate Remedy 
System forms for Department of Corrections disciplinary charges.  In addition, the 
Corrective Action Form contained a handwritten note that instructed Didiano to “speak 
with housing unit Sat. clarify dates.”1
When Didiano received the Corrective Action Form, he went to Nash and asked 
what he should do in response.  Nash told Didiano that someone from the prison wanted 
to meet with him and that Didiano should wait for the meeting to be scheduled.  Didiano 
followed Nash’s advice and did not take any action.   
    
In late May or early June 2009, Didiano met with a prison psychologist.  During 
                                                 
1 The handwriting is difficult to read, and defendants claim that the note actually states: 
“speak with housing unit Sgt. clarify dates.”  Although defendants’ reading seems more 
plausible, we accept Didiano’s reading for purposes of analyzing the grant of summary 
judgment. 
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the course of their conversation, Didiano told the psychologist about the complaints he 
had submitted, as well as the Corrective Action Form he had received in response.  He 
asked the psychologist to follow-up on the complaints and see if a meeting with the prison 
officials would be scheduled.  According to Didiano, however, the psychologist did not 
follow-up as requested.  No one from the prison ever contacted him to set up a meeting.                
 On July 30, 2010, Didiano filed suit in New Jersey state court against the South 
Woods State Prison and the prison administrator, Karen Balicki (“Balicki”).  Didiano 
named Balicki as a defendant in both her individual and official capacities.  The 
complaint also listed numerous “John Doe” individuals as defendants.  Didiano asserted 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Eighth Amendment rights, alleging 
that defendants failed to protect him from Howard’s unprovoked assault by allowing an 
inmate “with known psychological problems to remain in the general prison population” 
and to possess a “hot pot that was easily modifiable to become a dangerous 
instrumentality.”  He also asserted a claim under the New Jersey Civil Rights Act 
(“NJCRA”), N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2, for violations of the New Jersey state constitution under 
these same theories.   
 Defendants removed the case to federal court.  Following removal, they filed a 
motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment, raising several grounds in 
support of their motion, including: (1) that Didiano’s claims were barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment and the doctrine of sovereign immunity; (2) that Didiano’s claims were 
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barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, because he had failed to exhaust his 
administrative remedies before bringing suit; (3) that the prison and defendant Balicki, in 
her official capacity, are not “persons” amenable to suit under either § 1983 or the 
NJCRA; and (4) that there were no grounds for holding Balicki liable in her individual 
capacity.  Didiano opposed the motion.   
 Because the parties submitted evidence outside the pleadings, the District Court 
treated defendants’ motion as one for summary judgment and granted the motion.  The 
Court rejected defendants’ argument that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, but 
agreed that Didiano had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, that defendants 
were not “persons” within the meaning of § 1983 and the NJCRA, and that there was no 
basis for a claim against Balicki in her individual capacity.  Finally, the Court concluded 
that the claims against the John Doe individuals could not survive in light of the dismissal 
of the named defendants.  Didiano timely appealed.                  
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 
and 1367.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review 
over a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing all evidence in favor of the 
non-moving party and resolving all doubts in that party’s favor.  Albright v. Virtue, 273 
F.3d 564, 570 (3d Cir. 2001); S.E.C. v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 452 (3d Cir. 
1997); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).  
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A. 
 Didiano argues that the District Court erred in concluding that his claims against 
the prison and Balicki (in her official capacity) must be dismissed because they are not 
“persons” within the meaning of the NJCRA.  Like § 1983, the plain language of the 
NJCRA imposes liability on any “person” who violates a plaintiff’s civil rights under 
color of law.  In particular, the NJCRA provides in relevant part that:   
Any person who has been deprived of any . . . rights . . . secured by the 
Constitution or laws of the United States, or . . . by the Constitution or laws 
of this State, or whose exercise or enjoyment of those substantive rights, 
privileges or immunities has been interfered with or attempted to be 
interfered with, by threats, intimidation or coercion by a person acting 
under color of law, may bring a civil action for damages and for injunctive 
or other appropriate relief.  
 
N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2(c) (emphasis supplied).   
Interpreting the comparable language of § 1983,2
                                                 
2   The language of the federal civil rights statute provides: 
  the Supreme Court has held that 
the States, arms of the States, and state officials acting in their official capacities, are not 
 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other 
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be 
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper 
proceeding for redress . . . . 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis supplied). 
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“persons” within the meaning of the statute.  Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 
58, 71 (1989) (“We hold that neither a State nor its officials acting in their official 
capacities are ‘persons’ under § 1983”); Indep. Enters. Inc. v. Pittsburgh Water & Sewer 
Auth., 103 F.3d 1165 (3d Cir. 1997) (a political subdivision of the state is not a “person” 
within the meaning of § 1983 if it is effectively an “arm of the State” for Eleventh 
Amendment purposes).3
Although the NJCRA does not itself define the word “person,” the term is defined 
elsewhere in the New Jersey code:     
   Didiano concedes that his suit against the prison is essentially a 
claim against the Department of Corrections, an arm of the State of New Jersey.  He also 
concedes that Balicki is a state official that he has sued in her official capacity.  Thus, in 
the face of this binding Supreme Court authority, he does not dispute that his § 1983 
claims against the prison and Balicki (in her official capacity) must fail.  Rather, he 
contends that the District Court erred in dismissing his state-law NJCRA claim on this 
ground, arguing that there are good reasons why the word “person” should be interpreted 
differently in the NJCRA context than in § 1983, and should be construed to extend to 
defendants here.  We disagree.     
Unless it be otherwise expressly provided or there is something in the 
subject or context repugnant to such construction, the following words and 
phrases, when used in any statute and in the Revised Statutes, shall have the 
meaning herein given to them. 
. . . . 
Person.  The word “person” includes corporations, companies, associations, 
                                                 
3 Cf. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 23 (1991) (“We . . . hold that state officials sued in their 
individual capacities are ‘persons’ for purposes of § 1983.”) (emphasis supplied). 
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societies, firms, partnerships and joint stock companies as well as 
individuals . . . and, when used to designate the owner of property which 
may be the subject of an offense, includes this State, the United States, any 
other State of the United States as defined infra and any foreign country or 
government lawfully owning or possessing property within this State. 
 
N.J.S.A. § 1:1-2 (emphasis supplied).  In other words, the statutory definition explicitly 
states that the word “person” shall include the State of New Jersey only in the limited 
circumstance of certain property disputes not applicable here.  Thus, New Jersey has 
provided its own definition of the word “person,” and that definition does not include the 
State or defendants which are the functional equivalent of the State.    
 Didiano is left to argue only that a construction that excludes the State from the 
definition of the word “person” is repugnant to the subject and context of the NJCRA.  
Once again, we disagree.  Nothing in the language or subject matter of the NJCRA 
compels that conclusion.4
                                                 
4 Indeed, contrary to Didiano’s argument, the text of the NJCRA actually seems to support 
the conclusion that the State is not a “person” subject to suit.  Under the statute, one of 
the remedies for violating a plaintiff’s constitutional rights is the imposition of a civil 
penalty.  N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2(c) (citing subsection 10:6-2(e)).  The statute directs, however, 
that this “civil penalty shall be conveyed to the State Treasurer for deposit into the State 
General Fund.”  N.J.S.A. § 10:6-2(e) (emphasis supplied).  If the State were found liable 
in an NJCRA action, therefore, it would create the bizarre result of the State paying a civil 
penalty to itself.  This suggests that the legislature did not contemplate State liability 
under the NJCRA.     
  Instead, Didiano relies on cases and statements from outside 
the context of the NJCRA, including: (1) general statements of law suggesting that “New 
Jersey has a long and powerful tradition of enforcing state constitutional rights”; and (2) 
arguments that constitutional claims are not barred by the State’s sovereign immunity or 
 
 9 
the New Jersey Tort Claims Act.  (See Appellant’s Br. at 13-16).  Such abstract evidence, 
however, is insufficient to overcome the explicit statutory definition of “person” 
contained in § 1:1-2.  Accordingly, the District Court correctly granted summary 
judgment on Didiano’s claims against the State and Balicki, in her official capacity.5
B. 
    
 Even if Didiano has no viable claim against the prison and Balicki, in her official 
capacity, he argues that he nonetheless has a § 1983 claim against Balicki in her 
individual capacity.  The District Court concluded that he did not because any such § 
1983 claim was barred by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies.  We agree. 
 With respect to the exhaustion requirement, the PLRA provides that:  
No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 
1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies 
as are available are exhausted. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).  Under this requirement, the prisoner must pursue all available 
administrative remedies to their end, and must do so properly, i.e., without procedural 
default.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2004).  This is true regardless of 
whether the administrative remedies meet federal standards, whether they are “plain, 
speedy, and effective,” and whether the prisoner seeks relief not available in grievance 
                                                 
5 Because we conclude that the New Jersey statutes explicitly exclude the State from the 
definition of a “person” under § 1:1-2, we need not address the parties’ arguments about 
whether, and to what extent, the NJCRA should be interpreted identically to § 1983.    
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proceedings, notably money damages.  Id. at 227 (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 
524 (2002)).     
 Didiano “concedes that the PLRA applies to him and that he did not complete 
South Wood’s grievance process” because he did not respond to the Corrective Action 
Form.  (Appellant’s Br. at 25-26).  He argues, however, that that the exhaustion 
requirement does not apply where “prison officials’ conduct so interferes with a 
prisoner’s ability to use the grievance process that the remedy is not ‘available.’”  (Id. at 
25).  In support of this argument, he relies on Brown v. Croak, 312 F.3d 109 (3d Cir. 
2002).  In Brown, the district court dismissed a prisoner’s lawsuit for failure to exhaust 
his administrative remedies because he did not file a formal grievance with the prison.  
On appeal, we vacated the dismissal on the ground that the prisoner raised a genuine issue 
of material fact as to whether prison officials essentially thwarted or prevented him from 
exhausting the remedies.  The prisoner had alleged that prison officials told him he could 
not file a formal grievance until the prison’s “pre-grievance investigation” had been 
completed.  He waited for months, but was never told that the investigation was 
concluded.  Accepting his allegations as true, we held that the administrative remedies 
were not “available” to the prisoner within the meaning of the PLRA and the district court 
improperly dismissed his claim.                 
 Didiano’s reliance on Brown is misplaced.  The thrust of Brown is that the 
prisoner’s use of the administrative remedies was frustrated by the prison officials.  There 
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is simply no comparable evidence in this case.  Rather, Didiano admits that the prison 
properly sent him a Corrective Action Form explaining the actions needed to proceed 
with his complaints.  Because he wanted assistance with the Corrective Action Form, he 
went to a “prison paralegal” named Nash.  According to Didiano, it was Nash who told 
him to take no action and simply wait for the prison to set up a meeting.  If there was 
evidence that Nash was a prison official, this case would fall squarely within Brown.  
Defendants contend, however, that “prison paralegals” are not prison officials, but rather 
are fellow inmates who provide advice and counsel, and there is nothing in the record (or 
even in Didiano’s brief) to contradict that.  The fact that Didiano got bad advice from a 
fellow prisoner is unfortunate, but it does not excuse his failure to exhaust the 
administrative remedies.   
 Didiano is left to argue that he told a prison psychologist that he was expecting a 
meeting with the prison and asked him to “follow-up” to see if a meeting would be 
scheduled.  Even assuming the psychologist is a prison official, we are nonetheless 
unpersuaded.  According to defendants, prison psychologists do not have any authority 
related to the Inmate Remedy System.  The grievance system is instead handled by the 
social workers, housing unit officers, and the Inmate Remedy Coordinator.  Once again, 
there is nothing in either the record or Didiano’s brief to refute this.  In any event, the fact 
that the psychologist did not follow-up on Didiano’s inquiry regarding a meeting is not 
the kind of active “thwarting” of the grievance system that was present in Brown—
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especially in light of the fact that the Corrective Action Form specifically told Didiano 
what he needed to do to proceed.6
III. 
   Accordingly, the District Court did not err in granting 
summary judgment on Didiano’s § 1983 claim against Balicki in her individual capacity.    
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.    
 
                                                 
6 Although Didiano asserts he has difficulty with the English language, he did not at any 
time seek assistance from prison staff in understanding the Corrective Action Form.   
